Labour Union

Article 1 defines a labour union as the association of employees within a single company with the purpose of protecting and representing the shared interests of workers. Establishing a union is an optional matter rather than mandatory. Workers are not obligated to establish a union but they can if they choose to. The same article mentions that this can only be established if the organization has more than 50 employees. To register, an application must be submitted to the Ministry of Labour including the proposed name of the union, scope of activity, the address, minutes of the founding meeting, certified list of a minimum of 25 founding members, and a draft set of articles of association. The powers of the union entail litigating on behalf of members, participating in drafting the labour regulations of the establishment, and confidentially reviewing data regarding discipline, wages, and promotion, alongside negotiating collective agreements. Under article 31, to join the union the worker must be employed at the establishment, be at least 18 years old, not be currently a member of any other union, not be registered as an employer, and must pay fees prescribed for the union.

Trade Union

Article 1 says that a trade union is an organization formed by not less than five labour unions functioning in the same sector registered with the ministry. Just like labour unions establishing a trade union is optional not mandatory, and only one union is permitted per sector. To register, the founding labour unions must submit an application to the Ministry of Labour consisting of the proposed name of the union, scope of activity, the address, minutes of the founding meeting, a certified list of a minimum of five founding labour unions, and a draft set of articles of association. The powers of the trade union center on sector-wide collective bargaining, participating in labour-dispute panels, and coordination between the General Federation and member unions.

General Federation of Workers

The General Federation for Workers of the Sultanate of Oman is defined as the body consisting of all labour unions and trade unions that have joined it and registered with the ministry. It is the sole national tier that is positioned above the two. What differentiates the General Federation of Workers from the rest besides its scale, is its oversight. Article 4 states that no labour or trade union may associate with a global body without the prior approval of the federation. The federation sets the standard on membership dues throughout all unions and may freeze the work of a union or dissolve its membership for severe violations. It also represents Omani workers in multilateral interchange between the government and employers, and in global settings.

Conclusion

Understanding which tier you’re dealing with—labour union, trade union, or the General Federation of Workers—isn’t a technicality. It determines who has standing to negotiate, what’s actually on the table, and what a worker can expect in terms of dues, leave, and protection. To learn more about labour unions, trade unions, and the General Federation of Workers, we highly recommend that you read the Ministry of Labour Decision 284/2026 Regarding the Statute for the Formation, Work, and Registration of Labour Unions, Trade Unions, and the General Federation for Workers of the Sultanate of Oman:

Written by:

Malak Al Kharusi

Malak is a legal intern at Decree. She has previously interned in the government sector. She is interested in commercial law. She is about to start the final year of her Business Management and Law degree at Leeds Beckett University.

Giving Unions Room to Operate

One of the clearest obligations imposed on employers, is the duty to provide labour unions with the physical space and resources needed to operate. Under article 35, this means a properly equipped office, internet access, a phone line, and the other basics a union needs to operate. Additionally, employers shall permit access to relevant administrative and financial data affecting its members, such as, records tied to training, wages, decisions, promotions, and disciplinary action, in accordance with article 26. Though, the union must still adhere to the confidentiality of such data, and can only use it within the parameters the decision sets out.

Allowing Union Work to Take Place

The most substantial set of obligations imposed on employers concerns time. Fundamentally, it is about allowing employees to perform union work during work hours. Subject to article 66, union members must be excused from their regular duties to carry out union business. For smaller unions consisting of less than 100 members, 30 days per year suffices. Mid size unions consist of 100 to 300 members, meaning they get a total of 90 days per year. The union member selected by the administrative body for a union with more than 300 members, must be excused from work full-time. This is a meaningful switch from the old system, which calculated excusal on a weekly basis rather than an annual one. Furthermore, none of this comes at the employees expense. Excused members will keep their full wage, promotions, and periodic allowances, with their time away still counting towards their actual length of service, in accordance with article 69. Those excused full-time are also exempt from performance evaluation for these purposes, instead, their last review, or their average over the past three years if higher, is used to determine allowances and promotions. This decision introduces a new provision which requires employers to provide means of transport for members carrying out union tasks that are 150 kilometres away from the headquarters of the labour union, trade union, or the general federation, provided the establishment is notified at least 5 days before the task takes place, except in urgent cases, such as a workplace accident or a labour strike.

Limits on Employer Interference

Beyond what employers are required to do, the decision also sets restrictions on employer conduct. Under article 6, an employer is not permitted to transfer a member of the administrative body from the worksite the union has designated as its headquarters without the consent of the member. Furthermore, this extends to article 70 which prohibits an employer from performing an act which results in the disruption of union work. The non-disruption duty in article 70 reflects protections already grounded in the Labour Law, so it is not a new burden; the transfer restriction in article 6, however, does not appear in the old Ministerial Decision 500/2018 or in its 2022 amendment.

Supporting Union Democracy

The final obligation is more of a procedural one. Employers also have a role in supporting the democratic process within the union itself. Article 14 sets a duty upon employers to facilitate the election of members of the administrative body of a labour or trade union, a duty that carries over largely unchanged from the previous decision.

Conclusion

Ultimately, these obligations convey that Ministerial Decision 284/2026 asks relatively little of employers in financial terms. The real cost is in time, access, non-interference, and in understanding exactly what the decision now expects of them, with article 68’s transport requirement arising as the one genuinely new burden. It’s also worth noting that the decision’s changes extend beyond these specific duties. Registration is now considerably faster, and several approval powers have shifted from the Ministry to the General Federation, pointing to a union landscape that moves quicker and answers less directly to the state than before. For employers, the takeaway is straightforward. This decision is about making space, allowing time, and staying out of the way, not a financial one. For the full text of Ministerial Decision 284/2026, including provisions not covered in this post, we highly recommend reading it in full via the link below:

Written by:

Zayd Al Harrasi

Zayd is a legal intern at Decree. He is interested in corporate, commercial, and company law. He is about to start the final year of his Business Law Degree at Nottingham Trent University.

The Executive Branch

The executive authority is exercised by the Sultan with the assistance of the Council of Ministers who are entrusted with implementing the public policy of the state. Under article 51 of the Basic Statute of the State in an effort to assist the Sultan, the Council of Ministers may advise on matters that concern the state, such as proposing draft laws and royal decrees. Additionally, the Council of Ministers has a duty to safeguard citizens’ access to necessary services, and to oversee that laws, decrees, and other legal instruments are properly implemented. Furthermore, ministers oversee the affairs of the units they head, implement government policy within them, and monitor how that policy is carried out, in accordance with article 58.

The Legislative Branch

Oman’s legislative body, Majlis Oman, is divided into two Majlis’s. Majlis Al-Dawla and Majlis Al-Shura. Article 72 allows Majlis Oman to debate the state budget and development strategies, enact and amend draft laws, whilst also suggesting draft laws of its own. While it does come with its limitations, this is a legitimate legislative function. As Majlis Oman does not sit year-round, article 73 permits the Sultan to issue decrees between the Majlis sessions or while the Majlis Al-Shura is dissolved. As a result, law-making is not the sole domain of the legislature.

The Judicial Branch

According to articles 77 and 78, judicial authority is autonomous, exercised by the courts, and judges cannot be removed unless specifically authorized by law, meaning it is not permitted for any entities to interfere with court affairs as it may lead to charges punishable by law. Additionally, article 85 mandates that the legislature appoint a body capable of determining whether laws, decrees, and regulations comply with Oman’s constitution, the Basic Statute of the State.

Limits on the Separation of Powers

All three powers are distinguishable on paper. However, all three ultimately trace back to a single source of authority, the Sultan. Majlis Al-Dawla members are appointed by the Sultan rather than being elected. Judicial appointments run through the Sultan, and judgments are made and carried out in his name in accordance with article 81. The key point to remember is that, unlike the traditional separation of powers model, which is most closely linked to Montesquieu, Oman’s Basic Statute clearly distinguishes functions but does not split the power into completely independent branches. It is closer, in some respects, to the British model, where distinct institutions work alongside one another without one holding power to override or restrain another.

Conclusion

Oman’s Basic Statute draws clear functional lines between its executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, even where those institutions ultimately answer to the same source of authority. We highly recommend reading the full text of the Basic Statute of the State on Decree to explore these provisions in greater depth on the link below:

Written by:

Zayd Al Harrasi

Zayd is a legal intern at Decree. He is interested in corporate, commercial, and company law. He is about to start the final year of his Business Law Degree at Nottingham Trent University.

The Sultan, being the head of the state, oversees the three branches of the government instead of being within them. Article 48 addresses him as the supreme representative of the state and supreme commander of the armed forces, with his person inviolable and his command obeyed. Article 49 goes on to list all the functions of the head of the state, which include declaring a state of emergency; promulgating laws (which gives him ultimate authority over legislation); appointing and dismissing the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers, undersecretaries, senior judges, and senior military officers (which gives him the final word over the judiciary and the armed forces); and ratifying treaties. The Sultan’s authority effectively spans the legislative, executive, and judicial branches together with the military, regardless of who manages day-to-day administration underneath him.

The role of the Prime Minister is distinct from the role of the Sultan, whose primary responsibility is administering the executive branch and running the Council of Ministers, which is tasked with implementing public policy, overseeing the administrative apparatus, coordinating between ministries, and proposing draft laws and decrees for the Sultan’s approval.

In addition to these general functions, article 55 states that if the Sultan appoints a prime minister, the mandates and powers of the prime minister will be specified in the royal decree appointing him. Therefore, the role of the prime minister is distinct from the role of the Sultan, and the Basic Statute of the State explicitly specifies that the Sultan can appoint someone else in this position.

Nothing in the Basic Statute obliges the Sultan to ever exercise the option to appoint a prime minister, and nothing prevents him from doing so at any time; article 55 simply sits in reserve, a standing mechanism rather than an active office, ready to be activated by a single decree whenever it is judged useful.

Even though the Sultan today is acting in both capacities, just as Sultan Qaboos did for most of his reign, it is worth noting that Oman did have a prime minister other than the Sultan in the early seventies, who happened to be Sayyid Tarik bin Taimur, Sultan Haitham’s own father.

You can learn more about the functions of the Sultan and the Prime Minister by reading the full text of the Basic Statute of the State at the link below:

Written by:

Malak Al Kharusi

Malak is a legal intern at Decree. She has previously interned in the government sector. She is interested in commercial law. She is about to start the final year of her Business Management and Law degree at Leeds Beckett University.

If we go back to the very beginning, Oman criminalised cybercrimes for the first time in the year 2001 when a new chapter on computer crimes was added to the Penal Law of 1974. This chapter was titled “Computer Crimes” and generally covered technical offences relating to illegal access, interception, and interference with computer systems as well as misuse of payment cards. The legal concepts that this chapter governed were what an ordinary person on the street would consider to be a cybercrime, i.e. a crime of a technological nature that affects the accessibility or safety of the technology we use.

Ten years after the introduction of the computer crimes chapter to the Penal Law, Oman decided in 2011 to create a standalone Cybercrime Law. This law took the technical crimes that were originally introduced in 2001 and expanded them into four chapters on infringing data and systems, misuse of technology, digital forgery and fraud, and infringement of payment cards. In addition to these technical chapters, a chapter titled “Content Crimes” was added to the law that governed matters beyond technical crimes committed by hackers and cybercriminals. This chapter criminalised misconduct that was already mostly criminalised by the Penal Law and other Omani law (such as defamation, intellectual property infringement, and pornography) when this same act was committed using technological means. Generally speaking, a content crime under the Cybercrime Law carried a heavier punishment in comparison to the same act under the original law.

The extent to which the Cybercrime Law of 2011 had to re-criminalise offences that were already captured by the Penal Law is at best questionable. The Penal Law and other Omani laws have always been worded using expansive terminology that was not tied to a specific technology and which was already used to capture criminal conduct irrespective of the medium. Furthermore, if the objective was to provide legal certainty, the Cybercrime Law could have had a single provision to confirm the application of the Penal Law to crimes committed using technological means without having to repeat the crimes one by one.

As a result of the Cybercrime Law of 2011, we ended up with a legal framework where multiple laws criminalise the same exact conduct. For example, if you insult someone using a text message, that would be a crime under the Penal Law, the Cybercrime Law, and the Telecommunications Law; if you infringe copyright on the internet, that would be a crime under the Cybercrime Law and the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Law; if you launder money on the internet, that would be a crime under the Cybercrime Law and the Law of Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, etc.

Having the same conduct be governed by multiple laws makes predicting the application of the law difficult, especially since the Cybercrime Law does not always copy the terminology found in the original law that governs the content in question. However, my biggest problem with overloading the Cybercrime Law with content crimes that are already governed by other laws is that this distracted us from focusing on what the law is actually intended to govern. While the Cybercrime Law of 2011 had five substantive chapters with four covering technical crimes and one covering this strange category of content crimes, if you look at the number of articles in each of these chapters, the chapter on content crimes on its own is bigger (14 articles) than the four other chapters combined (12 articles).

The new Cybercrime Law of 2026 that came out last month retained the same general structure of having technical crimes and content crimes, but the technical crimes are now covered by 14 substantive articles while the content crimes are now covered by 33 substantive articles. In other words, the content crimes have more than doubled in comparison to the previous law and now take up almost two thirds of the substantive provisions of the law.

It is clear that the Omani government sees the Cybercrime Law more as a law to control illegal content on the internet than a law for controlling the misuse of technology. The new law does not introduce any transformative changes to the regulation of technical crimes and pays only lip service to contemporary issues such as artificial intelligence. Instead of focusing on technological developments, the new law introduces a new lengthy section on crimes against the state—not in regard to cyberattacks made against state networks—but in regard to content published against the state, publishing news that harms state prestige, insults against heads of other states, etc. The law also doubles down on increasing the penalties for many existing content crimes.

The disparity between the punishments for technical crimes and the content crimes provides further evidence that the Cybercrime Law has lost its purpose. The Cybercrime Law should help protect us, as individuals and as a state, against cyberattacks, so you would assume that the biggest fines under this law would be designated for those technical crimes that the law is intended to control. Under the new law, if a cybercriminal wipes the data and disables the systems of a private hospital, he would be punished under article 5 of the law with a maximum punishment of a single year, but if an individual posts a tweet with misleading information during a pandemic he would be punished under article 30 of the law with a maximum punishment of 15 years, 15 times the punishment of an actual cyberattack. In fact, the highest fine for a technical crime under the new law is only 20,000 Rial Omani under article 18 (which bizarrely was actually reduced from 50,000 Rial Omani under the previous law), whereas the highest fine for a non-technical crime is 500,000 Rial Omani under article 55.

Content crimes should not go unpunished, but the Cybercrime Law is not the place for determining what ordinary people should be allowed to post on the internet. This matter is already governed by the Penal Law, the Telecommunications Law, and many other laws. The Cybercrime Law should focus on combating cyberattacks, digital fraud, and misuse of technology that affects the safety and integrity of our digital systems. The new Cybercrime Law of 2026 makes it clear that we have forgotten the purpose of this law.

The new Cybercrime Law has already entered into force. You can read it in full in English on the link below:

The regulation organises the sector into six licences: operating or managing a tourist or hotel establishment; travel and tourism offices (and branches of foreign tourism companies); tourist guidance; adventure tourism; high art performance groups in hotels and restaurants; and business tourism. The last two stand out. Adventure tourism, everything from off-road desert driving and mountain trekking to caving, canyoning, and ziplining, now has its own licence and a dedicated annex listing exactly which activities are covered. Business tourism, meaning conferences, exhibitions, and corporate incentive trips, is recognised as a licensed activity in its own right.

Under the old regulation, if the ministry sat on a licence application for 60 days, that silence counted as a rejection. The new regulation flips this; the ministry has 60 days to decide, and if it says nothing, the application is deemed accepted. For a sector that lives or dies on getting projects open, this reversal is the most consequential single change in the regulation.

Tourist guiding in English remains reserved for Omanis. Guides are split into general, locational, and specialised categories, must keep groups to no more than 30 people at a site, and are barred from discussing politics or religion or from working in military, border, or customs zones without permission. Adventure tourism operators carry the heaviest safety burden: an Omani licence-holder, a security and safety audit certificate, insurance issued inside Oman, a licensed specialist guide on every trip, risk and safety management plans, and a duty to cancel outings when bad weather is forecast.

Several licence fees have actually come down; a five-star hotel licence now costs 1,900 Rial Omani for three years, against the previous 3,200 Rial Omani for five years. Establishments still collect a 4% tourism fee for the ministry and an 8% service charge, but the service charge must now be paid out to staff in cash. Administrative fines in the regulation are capped at 6,000 OMR.

You can read the new Executive Regulation of the Tourism Law in full in English on the link below:

MCP stands for Model Context Protocol, an open standard for enabling AI agents to access external tools. General-purpose AI tools such as Claude, as well as legal-specific solutions such as Harvey, do not have access to a reliable Omani legislation database, and therefore cannot be confidently trusted when it comes to matters specific to Omani law. Decree MCP allows you to power up your Claude and Harvey accounts by connecting them to Decree directly.

Decree MCP can also be used by organisations wishing to build their own custom-made AI solutions that require access to Omani legislation. For example, if an organisation in Oman wishes to build an in-house AI-powered compliance solution that maps obligations imposed by new Omani laws to specific departments, the in-house solution can link with Decree MCP to maintain continuous access to the latest legislation. This approach can also support greater compliance with data protection requirements, as Decree MCP provides only the legal information and leaves the organisation free to process that data without Decree’s involvement.

Decree MCP is currently experimental, and usage is rate-limited while we learn how legal teams put it to work in practice. Access is available to Decree members whose subscription bundle includes Lex AI.

If your subscription includes Lex AI, you can begin connecting Decree MCP to your AI tools today at https://mcp-lr.decree.om/.

Learn more about Decree MCP on the link below:

In 2025, the Law Regulating Real Estate was a major reform of the legal framework governing the real estate sector. This new Law of the Real Estate Registry updates the legal framework for the real estate registry, in other words, the way in which real estate is registered, to be aligned with the Law Regulating Real Estate that was issued last year.

One of the key features of the new law is the incorporation of the concept of a Preliminary Real Estate Registry for off-plan projects, allowing buyers to officially record their ownership and legal rights before a building is finished, which was already introduced by the Law Regulating Real Estate. Another update includes the option to request an English-language translation of your mulkiya, the formal recognition of temporary mulkiyas, and clear rules for registering real estate gifted to minors or seized by court order.

One of the more notable additions of the new law is that it allows the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning to outsource certain documentation functions relating to the Real Estate Registry to the private sector. The law does not provide a lot of details on the scope of this possible delegation.

Penalties for real estate fraud have also been dramatically increased. Previously, under the Statute of the Real Estate Registry, knowingly registering a false document to deprive someone of their real estate rights carried a tiny fine of just 200 Rial Omani. Now, that same offence carries a prison sentence of six months to three years, plus a fine ranging from 1,000 to 30,000 Rial Omani.

The Law of the Real Estate Registry enters into force today. You can read it in full in English on the link below:

The Legal Status of a Special Zone

The AI Special Zone is a special economic zone governed by the Law of Special Economic Zones and Free Zones, issued by Royal Decree 38/2025, exactly like the Special Economic Zone at Duqm.

A zone created by virtue of this law is granted specific benefits so that the zone is attractive to foreign investment. For example, companies doing business in the zone get up to thirty years of exemption from corporate income tax, customs exemptions for imported and exported goods, and exemptions from minimum capital requirements. Furthermore, land within the zone is allocated by lease or usufruct outside the constraints of the regular Land Law.

One of the key benefits of the zone will be the creation of a one-stop shop that handles all licensing and permits required for the operation of companies in the zone. The law places a strict deadline for issuing the licences and permits within the zone. For example, labour permits for non-Omani employees must be issued within five working days.

There are also other benefits, like a single comprehensive approval for strategic projects and residency for the owners of the company.

How will it be operated?

The law requires the AI Special Zone to be operated by an operator appointed by the Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones. This operator has to be a company. The news outlets have reported that the government has appointed an Omani company called Afouq Investment and Development United to both establish and operate the zone.

How does it differ from IFCO?

One of the biggest announcements of the year was the establishment of the International Financial Centre of Oman, and it’s important to point out the differences between these two projects.

The AI Special Zone provides a number of specific exemptions and benefits, but it is still governed by Omani law. For example, Omanisation rules still apply in the AI Special Zone, the Commercial Companies Law also applies, and Omani courts have full jurisdiction over the zone. In particular, the Omanisation rules prohibit the hiring of non-Omani software engineers, and therefore, this prohibition will apply to companies working in the zone.

Unlike the AI Special Zone, IFCO is a totally independent legal jurisdiction in which Omani law does not apply and has its own court system. This means that the Omanisation rules categorically do not apply.

However, even though the AI Special Zone will still be bound by Omani law, the ability of the zone to attract the AI industry will depend on factors beyond the law, such as its ability to provide infrastructure and services, as well as other facilities that make the zone an attractive destination for the AI industry.

You can learn more about special economic zones, such as the AI Special Zone, by reading the Law of Special Economic Zones and Free Zones in full in English on the link below:

The Sultanate of Oman is now a party to two of the most important international treaties governing cross border dispute resolution: The New York Convention, which deals with arbitration awards, and the Singapore Convention, which deals with settlement agreements resulting from mediation.

While both serve the same broad goal of making it easier to enforce the outcomes of alternative dispute resolution across borders, they differ in scope, mechanism, and history. This post examines what each convention does and how Oman has adopted them.

What Each Convention Does

New York Convention: Formally the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. This convention creates a uniform mechanism for enforcing arbitral awards issued in one contracting state within the territory of another, eliminating the need to relitigate the dispute from scratch.

Singapore Convention: Formally the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation. It does for mediation what the New York Convention did for arbitration, enabling direct enforcement of international mediation settlement agreements across member states.

Given the key difference between arbitration and mediation, the New York Convention is used to enforce the arbitral award decided by the arbitration tribunal, while the Singapore Convention is used to enforce the settlement agreement signed between the parties to a mediation process.

Oman’s Accession: A Timeline

Oman acceded to the New York Convention, which was entered into force in 1959, through Royal Decree 36/98, making it part of Omani law with effect from 10 June 1998.

Nearly three decades later, Oman joined the Singapore Convention, which entered into force in 2020, through Royal Decree 6/2026, issued on 11 January 2026. Oman is considered one of the early adopters of the Singapore Convention.

What This Means for Businesses

For international companies and investors in Oman, the practical significance is straightforward. An arbitral award issued in any of the 170+ New York Convention member states can be enforced in Oman without relitigating the merits.

Now, a settlement agreement resulting from mediation conducted in any Singapore Convention member state enjoys a similarly streamlined pathway. Mediation settlements are no longer “weaker” instruments; they are legally binding and enforceable.

Interaction with Omani Law

Given the maturity of the arbitration framework in Oman, the New York Convention operates directly and clearly within the legal framework of the Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Disputes and the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law. Article 1 of the Arbitration Law expressly preserves the primacy of international agreements, while article 9 grants the Court of Appeal in Muscat jurisdiction over international commercial arbitrations. Article 58 stipulates that enforcement requires that the award does not violate Oman’s public order and that the award is final in its country of origin.

Oman does not currently have a proper legal framework for governing mediation as a form of alternative dispute resolution, nor does it have any legal provisions that govern settlement agreements arising out of mediation proceedings outside the general provisions of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law that are triggered when the parties decide to settle a dispute that has already been presented before the court, not those that have independently been reached by the parties without starting litigation first. The Law of Public Notaries can be used to give settlement agreements the power of enforcement documents, but this requires both parties to notarise the agreement before the Public Notary, which is not usually possible if one of the parties is not in Oman.

It is worth noting that the mediation concept found in the Singapore Convention is not the same as the mediation concept found in the Omani Law of Mediation and Conciliation, which relates to mediation through official government tribunals, and not through an independent mediator.

This means that even though Oman is legally bound to provide a mechanism for recognising settlement agreements resulting from mediation, a domestic legal framework still does not exist for the courts to enforce such agreements.

Conclusion

This blog post highlighted the key differences between the New York Convention and the Singapore Convention and how each operates within the Omani legal framework.

For the Singapore Convention to achieve its objectives, Oman must consider issuing a standalone mediation law as well as specific provisions for the courts to enforce settlement agreements that meet the requirements of the Singapore Convention.

You can read the full text of the Singapore Convention on the link below: