Long Due Reform
Oman’s first ever Advocacy Law was issued in 1996, and since then, this law had very few amendments made to it, with the most recent of these amendments being more than 16 years ago. The law badly was due for an overhaul with the main apparent drivers of the reform being the desire to improve the quality of Omani advocates.
The previous system for qualifying as a lawyer in Oman was an apprenticeship system where a law graduate was merely required to register in any law firm for a period of two years, and then submit evidence of court submission he worked on to the government to be registered as a primary court lawyer. This practice has been very problematic as it was not uncommon for a law graduate to register in a law office of one of his relatives, not do any work for two years, and then take submissions written by another person in the law office to submit to the government to obtain his licence. Even in cases that are not as extreme as this, the government had no proper system in place to evaluate the apprenticeship experience of the lawyer or determine if this person is capable of providing services at the required standard.
This issue is compounded as many young Omani lawyers would quit the law firm that they trained in immediately after they obtain their primary court licence to establish their own office with no meaningful practical experience in law or in running a business, and this resulted in the creation of hundreds of law firms scattered all over the country with questionable credentials that are, in turn, supposed to train and qualify the next generation of Omani lawyers.
Another issue that the new law attempts to address is the challenges relating to the operation of foreign law firms in Oman. Due to legal requirements in the old law that restrict the ability to establish law firms to licensed advocates, foreign law firms wishing to operate in Oman usually had to partner with a local law firm using contractual arrangements, and then would hire Omani and non-Omani staff who would provide legal advice, technically a regulated activity restricted to licensed advocates, without being registered with the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs. This was controversial for a variety of reasons, especially from a regulatory point of view as a significant segment of the legal industry—that was giving advice to the biggest companies in the country—was operating without any regulatory oversight by the government.
Two Types of Law Firms
The key fundamental change to the regulation of the legal profession under the new law is that law firms will now fall under two categories: advocacy offices and legal consultancy offices, with advocacy offices being licensed to perform litigation related matters, issue legal advice, draft contracts, and carry out company formation procedures, while legal consultancy offices being licensed to issue legal advice, draft contracts, and carry out company formation procedures, i.e. everything that an advocacy office does outside litigation. Technically speaking, representing a client in arbitration in Oman falls under the litigation provisions, but the law carved out arbitration for legal consultancy offices to allow them to represent their clients before arbitral tribunals.
Similarly, actual lawyers will now also fall under two categories: advocates and legal consultants, and both of these categories of lawyers have to register with the MJLA.
Advocacy Profession
The advocacy profession will be restricted to Omanis, and will now generally require passing a qualification exam to move up the rolls of advocates. This includes passing an exam to move from the roll of trainee advocates to the roll of primary court advocates, passing another exam to move to the roll of courts of appeal advocates, and passing a final exam to move to the roll of Supreme Court advocates. There are also now continuous professional development requirements to move up the ladder, but not to retain the licence. The qualification periods have been significantly reduced, with the time required to move from primary courts to courts of appeal reduced from five to three years, and the time required to move from courts of appeal to the Supreme Court reduced from seven to five years.
There are also a few exceptions to the exam requirements. For example, a new register will be created for government officials acting as advocates for their entities who will not be required to take the exam if they wish to become advocates after they leave the government as long as they provide evidence that they actually practised advocacy on behalf of the government during their service. Working in a legal function in the government or in any company can also qualify a person to become an advocate for different court levels, but this will require the candidate to take the exam required for the court level in question. However, the required period of experience for these two categories is different and both are longer than the period required for advocates.
There are also other controls on the operation of advocacy offices, including a legal requirement for all law firms to have professional indemnity, more specific restrictions on marketing their services, additional formalities for pro bono work, a new obligation to continuously have at least one advocate trainee appointed in the advocacy office, a requirement for those with a combined law degree (law and business, law and economics, etc.) to meet certain course requirements to qualify, provisions to limit revolving door practices by judges and public prosecutors who become advocates, and many more.
Legal Consultancy Profession
Under the new law, it will not be permitted for any person to provide legal consultancy services without registering with the MJLA. This means that all lawyers working in all law firms, whether Omani or not, and whether they are licensed as advocates or not, will now be required to register with the MJLA.
The new law also allows foreign law firms to establish legal consultancy offices on their own or jointly in partnership with other Omani legal consultation offices. However, the law does not appear to allow a foreign legal consultant to establish an office in his personal capacity with an Omani legal consultant.
The law does not provide any details on the requirements to register as a legal consultant or much information on the rights and obligations of legal consultants, but these are expected to be detailed in the executive regulation of the law. The law also stipulates that the MJLA will issue a code of conduct for legal consultants that is distinct from the code of conduct for advocates.
The Way Ahead
The new examination formalities for the qualification of advocates are definitely a step in the right direction and they have the potential to transform the advocacy industry if these exams are properly designed and executed. However, this will not be easy given that the Omani legal educational system as a whole is still not mature and the available educational resources for Omani legal education are extremely limited. Given that law colleges themselves struggle to find proper material to teach their students, the training materials for these exams will have to be developed from scratch.
The legal industry also needs more than legal knowledge to be able to develop, and Omani law firms would greatly benefit from more general skills on how to run and manage their offices as a business.
The fact that all lawyers, both advocates and legal consultants, will now be required to register with the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs is also a step in the right direction, but in the same way advocates, accountants, and doctors, are required to meet certain criteria before they are able to practice their profession, legal consultants should obviously also be required to meet their own criteria before they are allowed to give advice.
The new Advocacy and Legal Consultancy Law will enter into force after six months, and existing law firms have one year to comply with its provisions.
You can read the new law in full in English on the link below:
]]>As we all know by now, AI has the potential to have numerous legal implications in regard to privacy, intellectual property, user safety, and discrimination. This new Council of Europe AI Convention attempts to set legal obligations on states that join this convention to ensure that all activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems are consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law, both in regard to activities undertaken by public authorities as well as private actors.
The convention sets key principles that states need to respect, such as human dignity and individual autonomy, transparency and oversight, accountability and responsibility, equality and non-discrimination, privacy and personal data protection, reliability, and safe innovation. The convention requires states to introduce measures that require that persons affected by AI systems are notified of the use of AI and grant such persons the right to challenge decisions relating to them that were made by AI systems. The convention also requires states to have measures that require carrying out AI impact assessment on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
The convention does not have many specifically prescribed actions that states need to take, and appears to be written in a manner that gives states more flexibility in regard to the measures that states are required to impose against private actors. It also gives states the ability to introduce provisions in a gradual manner while taking into consideration the unique context of each country.
The convention does not appear to have teeth, as there are no serious consequences for states that fail to meet their obligations. There is also no formal complaints procedure that allows individuals to take action against states that violate their obligations. Furthermore, the convention excludes from its scope activities within the lifecycle of AI systems relating to the protection of national security interests, and there is a separate paragraph that states that “matters relating to national defence do not fall within the scope of this Convention”. This is disappointing as it means that the convention will probably not be useful to stop states such as Israel from using AI systems, like Gospel and Lavender, in military operations, even if these acts are deemed war crimes by the ICJ.
It is also worth noting that this convention is an international agreement that is only binding on the countries that choose to sign it and then complete their domestic constitutional formalities to ratify it. At the time of writing, it has been signed by 10 states plus the EU. However, the treaty will only enter into force after at least 5 states that sign it complete their domestic ratification processes. This treaty is also not open for Council of Europe non-members to join, unless they are invited.
Oman has never joined any Council of Europe convention in its history, with the exception of the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters which was a joint project by the Council of Europe and the OECD. It is practically impossible that Oman would ever join this convention.
However, in the same way the EU AI Act that was adopted earlier this year is likely to be used as a benchmark for any new AI laws issued in Oman or elsewhere, it is not unlikely for the GCC or the Arab League to decide to take part in this new trend of AI regulation and develop their own AI treaty using the same principles that the Council of Europe has now codified as principles of public international law.
The Council of Europe AI Convention will only enter into force after the ratification of 5 member states from among those who sign the convention. You can read it in full on this link.
Governance of AI
The use of artificial intelligence has countless legal and ethical implications. From civil and criminal liability resulting from AI systems, to ethical issues relating to the training of AI models using biased data that results in, for example, AI systems assuming that all individuals with Middle Eastern features are likely to be terrorists, and therefore flagging them for additional investigation at airports.
Countries around the world are considering these implications, and the EU was the first country to issue a comprehensive and legally binding piece of legislation to govern artificial intelligence in the form of the EU AI Act. This act adopts a risk-based approach to AI regulation and completely prohibits the use of AI tools of unacceptable levels of risk, such as social scoring systems and predictive policing, and imposes no obligations on minimal risk AI systems such as spam filters. The act imposes some obligations on limited risk AI systems, such as basic chatbots, and imposes more serious obligations on high risk AI systems, such as those used in recruitment. The act imposes substantial fines against violators that go up to 35 million Euros or 7% of the annual turnover of the violator.
What is a Policy?
The public consultation document published by the MTCIT suggests that Oman is not going to have a stringent artificial intelligence governance framework that is similar to the EU, and will follow a more permissive approach by adopting a non-legally binding policy.
To understand what this policy means in the Omani legal context, it might be useful to clarify the levels of legislation we have in this country. Legislation in Oman can be classified as primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary legislation is issued by the Sultan and includes royal decrees and laws, such as the Personal Data Protection Law. Secondary legislation is issued by a minister and includes ministerial decisions and executive regulation, such as the Executive Regulation of the Personal Data Protection Law. Executive regulations, like laws, are also legally binding and those who violate them may be fined or held accountable using other forms of enforcement. The final and third level is tertiary legislation, and even though tertiary legislation is usually issued by a minister, it is not usually legally binding. This category of legislation includes things like circulars and policies, such as the Personal Data Protection Policy of Government Units. These policies are intended to provide non-legally binding instructions, and the MTCIT usually issues them to provide to other government entities details on the best practices for IT governance.
So unlike the Personal Data Protection Law, which was legally binding and imposes fines up to half a million Rial Omani, the MTCIT is considering to issue the AI governance framework as a non-legally binding policy that does not impose any fines against those who violate it and provides no real mechanism of enforcement.
Oman National AI Policy
The draft National Artificial Intelligence Policy provides high-level principles that must be taken into consideration when developing or deploying an AI system. It requires complying with general ethical principles relating to privacy, equity, transparency, and accountability. Even though the MTCIT did not follow the risk-based approach established by the EU AI Act, the MTCIT makes the distinction used by the EU AI Act when it comes to the providers and deployers of AI systems and imposes a different set of obligations on those who develop an AI system (i.e. providers) and those who use an AI system (i.e. deployers). For example, the policy requires providers to carry out an impact assessment for an AI system before it is deployed, and requires deployers to provide mechanisms for human supervision over decisions made by an AI system.
In addition to these general requirements, the policy provides a long list of good practices that providers of AI systems are meant to adopt, such as performing periodic evaluations, establishing rail guards for the use of AI systems, adopting cyber security provisions, etc, and another set of general requirements that deployers of AI systems are meant to adopt, such as complying with the Personal Data Protection Law, destroying the data appropriately after use, and ensuring that the data used is clean and reliable.
The provisions of the policy will apply to both public and private organisations in Oman that provide or deploy AI systems. However, it will not apply to individuals.
Wait and See Approach
The fact that the MTCIT has chosen not to issue a legally binding instrument is probably a wise decision, especially given that the Omani government has a history of over-regulation and imposing impractical conditions that make it extremely difficult for major applications to comply with (for example, MTCIT’s Executive Regulation of the Law of Carriage by Land and TRA’s Regulation Governing the Provision of Voice or Video Telecommunications Service over Internet Protocol require transportation apps, such as Uber, and VoIP apps, such as FaceTime and Whatsapp Calls, to have their servers locally hosted in Oman, and since these apps are unable to comply with the law, these services are blocked).
Given the fast pace at which AI technology is developing, attempting to create legally binding rules at this point in time can have unpredictable results, and it is more reasonable to wait and see how this technology develops before attempting to strictly regulate it.
However, this is not to say that there are no areas of law that need rapid intervention to address certain AI-risks. For example, the Omani Personal Data Protection Law needs to be amended to introduce a requirement to obtain the consent of a data subject before using his personal data for profiling purposes or automated decision-making, granting the data subject the right to object to such uses, or at least imposing an obligation on a data controller to disclose to the data subject that his personal data is being used by such tools. These AI-related data subject rights are already found in the laws of many countries, including neighbouring countries such Bahrain and the UAE.
Public Consultation
The public consultation for the draft National AI Policy is still open. Those interested in reading the document in full and in sharing their feedback with the MTCIT can do so by visiting this link. The public consultation period closes on 28 August 2024.
The emergence of AI technology has significant implications from a variety of legal perspectives: from privacy and intellectual property, to safety and criminal liability. At first instance, the EU AI Act might appear to be an extension of the GDPR as a privacy legislation, but in fact, it is closer in structure and approach to an EU product safety regulation, as it adopts a risk-based approach where the regulatory burdensomeness imposed on an AI system will depend on the level of risk imposed by such a system. Accordingly, the EU AI Act identifies four levels of risk:
- Unacceptable Risk AI Systems: The AI Act completely bans AI systems that are incompatible with EU fundamental rights, such as social scoring systems, predictive policing, and real-time remote biometrics systems. Some of these systems are already used in places such as China and they are now considered banned in the EU.
- High-Risk AI Systems: Systems that negatively affect safety or fundamental rights if misused, such as those used for the identification of persons, in education, and for the purpose of access to services and benefits. Such systems are subject to stringent rules including requirements for assessments prior to the introduction of the systems into the EU.
- Limited Risk AI Systems: Systems that have a limited risk for manipulation and deceit, such as chatbots, have less stringent rules, such as transparency requirements that require disclosing the use of an AI system.
- Minimal Risk AI Systems: A system that does not fall under any of the previous categories is considered a minimal risk system. The example commonly used is spam filters. Such systems are not subject to any regulations.
The EU AI Act was in the making for a number of years before ChatGPT was made popular, and accordingly, it does not use or refer to the concept of generative AI. However, it has special provisions for General Purpose AI systems, and imposes additional transparency obligations for these systems with some stricter rules if the AI system is powerful enough to meet the definition of “systemic risk” used by the AI Act. It is also worth noting that the EU AI Act passingly mentions that the providers or General Purpose AI must comply with copyright law.
The nature of the obligations imposed under the EU AI Act depends on whether a person is considered a Provider or a Deployer of an AI system. The Provider is the person responsible for developing the AI System, while the Deployer is the person who is using an AI system developed by another person. Under the EU AI Act, most burdensome obligations are imposed on the Provider, and not on the Deployer.
The fines for violating the EU AI Act are significant, and can be up to 35 million Euros or 7% of the annual turnover of a company. The EU AI Act is expected to enter into force in phases, with the full implementation taking place after two years.
The EU AI Act is likely to have implications for Oman in a number of ways. Omani companies that are doing business in Europe, such as Oman Air and others, will have to make sure that they comply with the EU AI Act when deploying AI systems for their operations, especially as the law applies to some public-facing common AI tools such as chatbots. It is also extremely likely for provisions of the EU AI Act to be directly or indirectly transplanted into the Omani legal system. Given the lack of any other comprehensive legal framework for governing AI to be used as a benchmark, Omani policymakers might adopt some of the concepts found in the EU AI Act when developing an Omani framework for the governance of AI. It will also not be unlikely for the GCC to develop a pan-GCC legal instrument, whether a treaty or a model law, that governs AI, which uses some of the concepts found in the EU AI Act.
The Omani Personal Data Protection Law is an example of how provisions of a European law were transplanted into the Omani legal system. However, this same law also illustrates the unwillingness of the Omani government to impose restrictions on itself even when this is necessary for the protection of fundamental rights. For example, the Omani Personal Data Protection Law completely exempts the government from its scope leaving members of the public with no recourse against the government when government employees violate data protection rights.
It will not be surprising if the Omani government chooses not to limit its ability to use any AI system available to it, including those that the EU has decided to totally ban, such as social scoring systems and predictive policing, some of which are already used in places such as China.
The EU AI Act will fully enter into force after two years. You can read it in full on this link.
I hope that I can say that the wait is finally over now that the regulation is finally out, but, realistically speaking, it will probably take the government at least several months to be able to create the processes required for them to receive and process applications relating to the permits envisioned by the law, and for this reason, the decision issuing the executive regulation has given another 1 year grace period for all parties involved to comply with the regulation and, by association, comply with the law.
This blog post will highlight some of the key features of the new regulation.
Permits for Processing of Sensitive Data
Article 5 of the Personal Data Protection Law requires any entity wishing to process sensitive data, such as health data, biometric data, and other forms of sensitive data, to obtain a permit from the MTCIT before processing such data. This provision has a wide scope of application and can include organisations using fingerprint readers to track the attendance of their employees, organisations asking their employees or customers to provide vaccination data, organisations asking customers to provide allergy requirements, and any other organisation that asks for health or biometric data from any person.
The regulation has now provided details regarding the information that is required to be provided by those applying for such permits and stipulates that the MTCIT has 45 days to decide on the application. If the MTCIT fails to respond within this time limit, the application is automatically deemed rejected. The applicant has the right to appeal to the minister, but if the minister fails to respond within 60 days, the appeal is also automatically deemed rejected. I believe that the approach adopted by the MTCIT in this regard is outrageous and is intended to relieve the ministry from carrying out one of its most basic duties: responding to applications legitimately made by Omani businesses. Given that MTCIT was unable to put in place a system for receiving such applications for a period of two years, it would be reasonable for applicants to check if the MTCIT is ready to receive their applications before they submit them to avoid having their applications rejected by the operation of law.
Data Subject Rights
One of the nice things about the Personal Data Protection Law was the recognition of data subject rights in article 11 which includes the right of a data subject to have their personal data erased, retrieved, or transferred to another entity. The regulation stipulates that data controllers have a duty to respond to such requests within 45 days. If the controller fails to respond to the request or denies it, the data subject has the right to complain to the MTCIT, and if the MTCIT fails to respond within 60 days, the complaint is … deemed rejected.
Of course, failure by the MTCIT to respond to a complaint can still be challenged under the administrative justice system, but I do not think that it is reasonable to expect individuals to go to court for simple matters such as the failure of a controller to fulfil a subject access request.
Article 17 of the executive regulation also creates two grounds to allow a controller to refuse to fulfil a request by a data subject, namely, refusal on the ground that a request is vexatious, and refusal on the ground that a request requires extraordinary effort to fulfil. In my opinion, granting the controller the right to refuse a request simply because it requires effort is not reasonable. Certain complex requests can be extremely fundamental to the livelihood of a person, such as a request to transfer health data from one private hospital to another private hospital, or a request to obtain data from an employer so that an employee can use it in an unfair dismissal lawsuit. The law and the regulation should have required the controller to fulfil all legitimate requests, and provide a framework for allowing the controller to request compensation to cover the cost required to fulfil the request. This is a common approach found in other similar laws including the GDPR.
Personal Data Protection Officer
Many people have been anxious about the obligation under article 20 of the Personal Data Protection Law which requires controllers to identify a personal data protection officer. The regulation did not provide any limitations regarding who would be expected to comply with this obligation. This means that if you are a small restaurant that saves its customers’ phone numbers or if you are a major utilities company, you must have a personal data protection officer. However, it is worth noting that the wording of the law and the regulation does not actually appear to require appointing an employee as a personal data protection officer, but simply designating one to be responsible for this task. This means that any existing employee can be designated as the organisation’s personal data protection officer and have him recognised as such while simultaneously carrying out another function.
Cross-Border Transfer of Personal Data
Another major area of uncertainty in Omani law in general and in the Personal Data Protection Law in particular has been the extent to which personal data can be transferred outside Oman. The regulation has now confirmed that there are no requirements to obtain the approval of the MTCIT before doing so and that there is no white list or black list of countries to which the data can be transferred. Instead, the regulation simply requires that the external processing entity has an adequate level of protection for personal data not less than the level of protection prescribed in accordance with Omani law. There are also some general requirements that stipulate that the transfer must not prejudice national security or higher state interests.
The cross-border chapter of the regulation also has an interesting provision in article 37 regarding the cases in which a transfer outside the Sultanate would be permitted without the consent of the data subject, namely, transfers required by treaties that Oman has signed and transfers carried out after anonymising the data. The first exemption probably relates to judicial cooperation agreements and tax cooperation agreements that require states to share information between themselves for a variety of purposes. On the other hand, the second exemption is weird because the exchange of anonymised data does not require the approval of the data subject in all cases because this data is incapable of identifying the person and therefore it would not fall under the definition of personal data to start with.
Final Thoughts
The issuance of the Executive Regulation of the Personal Data Protection Law is an extremely positive step towards the protection of privacy in Oman. However, it is important to remember that the Personal Data Protection itself only offers the bare minimum of rights to data subjects and does not address many of the contemporary issues of data protection, especially those relating to the use of artificial intelligence. The executive regulation created a very simple framework for implementing subject access requests, but the regulation has been written with a mindset of minimising the obligations of the MTCIT and not with a mindset of maximising the upholding of personal data protection rights.
Article II of the decision issuing the Executive Regulation of the Personal Data Protection Law grants data controllers and processes a year to comply with the law, but the regulation has technically entered into force already today. It is highly recommended that organisations subject to the provisions of this law take the necessary measures to comply with it.
Translation Note
Decree’s translation of the Personal Data Protection Law and its regulation follows the English terminology found in foreign and model data protection laws. However, the Omani law uses the terms [نقل] and [تحويل] in Arabic, which can both be translated as transfer without having any commonly known technical differences between them, and for which we were unable to find direct counterparts in our resources. We decided to retain this distinction in English by translating them as transport and transfer, as we suspect that the Arabic term for transport might refer to the transfer of physical location of the data from one physical data centre to another (in a data portability and a data localisation sense), while transfer might refer to the digital transfer of data between two physical locations without removing the data from its original source.
Composition and Structure
Majlis Oman, i.e. the Omani parliament, is made up of two organs, Majlis Al-Dawla and Majlis Al-Shura, with Majlis Al-Dawla being a body appointed by His Majesty the Sultan, and Majlis Al-Shura, the subject of this post, being a body elected by the people. The two primary legal instruments that govern Majlis Oman are the Basic Statute of the State and the Law of Majlis Oman.
Majlis Al-Shura is composed of 86 members elected by direct secret vote to represent each wilayat of the Sultanate of Oman, with a single member representing a wilayat whose population does not exceed 30,000 people and two members representing a wilayat whose population exceeds this number.
To be eligible for candidacy, an individual running for Majlis Al-Shura must be an Omani national by origin, must be at least 30 years old by the Gregorian calendar on the commencement date of candidature, and must be educated with at least a General Education Diploma level. This is a more stringent requirement than the requirements for the membership of Majlis Al-Dawla which does not require the candidate to be Omani by origin or to have a minimum level of education.
The law prohibits members of Majlis Al-Shura from remaining as government employees once they are successfully elected as members of the Majlis.
Term
The Term of Majlis Al-Shura is four years.
Mandate
The primary function of Majlis Al-Shura is legislative in nature. Like Majlis Al-Dawla, in the combined role of Majlis Al-Shura and Majlis Al-Dawla as Majlis Oman, Majlis Al-Shura contributes to making proposals for new laws and proposals for amending existing laws. Majlis Al-Shura also has the mandate to review all draft laws as well as draft amendments of the laws that are submitted to them by the Council of Ministers, before they are submitted to His Majesty the Sultan by the Council of Oman with any remarks by Majlis Al-Shura and Majlis Al-Dawla.
In addition to the legislative function of Majlis Oman, the Majlis is also responsible for reviewing new development plans that the government prepares as well as the General Budget of the State. An interesting aspect of the review of development plans and the General Budget of the State is that the session conducted to review them is usually confidential and not open to the public or the press.
Majlis Al-Shura also has some supervisory functions that are unique to it and do not apply to Majlis Al-Dawla. For example, Majlis Al-Shura has the mandate to review economic and social international agreements that Oman intends to sign with other countries (such as double taxation agreements, investment treaties, and free trade agreements). Furthermore, Majlis Al-Shura has the power to interrogate ministers, question them, and submit urgent statements to the Council of Ministers.
Conclusion
Majlis Al-Shura is without a doubt the most important body in the Majlis of Oman as it provides key checks and balances to the Omani legal system.
Composition and Structure
Majlis Oman, i.e. the Omani parliament, is made up of two organs, Majlis Al-Dawla and Majlis Al-Shura, with Majlis Al-Dawla, the subject of this post, being a body appointed by His Majesty the Sultan, and Majlis Al-Shura being a body elected by the people. The two primary legal instruments that govern Majlis Oman are the Basic Statute of the State and the Law of Majlis Oman.
Even though the members of Majlis Al-Dawla are appointed by His Majesty the Sultan, the Law of Majlis Oman sets a criteria for who can be appointed as a member. Namely, they must be Omani nationals, must be 40 years of age or older, must not have been convicted of a felony or a crime prejudicial to honour or integrity, and must not suffer from a mental illness. This criteria is less stringent than that of Majlis Al-Shura which requires the member to be Omani by origin, have at least a general education diploma, and not be associated with security agencies.
The law provides segments of society from which members of Majlis Oman may be appointed, such as academia, science, literature, culture, and those who have contributed to the development of the country. However, in practice, there are no restrictions as to who His Majesty can appoint as a member.
It is worth noting that membership of Majlis Al-Dawla is not generally a full-time job, but the law still prohibits being a member of Majlis Al-Dawla and concurrently remaining as a public employee, unless the member is identified as a person known for their competence and experience in the fields of science, literature, and culture, or as a professor of a university, college, or a higher institute.
Majlis Oman has a chairman and two deputies, who are elected by the other members in the very first session of the majlis.
Term
The term of Majlis Al-Dawla is four years, i.e. the same as Majlis Al-Shura.
Mandate
The primary function of Majlis Al-Dawla is legislative in nature. In the combined role of Majlis Al-Shura and Majlis Al-Dawla as Majlis Oman, Majlis Al-Dawla contributes to making proposals for new laws and proposals for amending existing laws. Majlis Al-Dawla also has the mandate, along with Majlis Al-Shura to review all draft laws as well as draft amendments of the laws that are submitted to them by the Council of Ministers, before they are submitted to His Majesty the Sultan by the Council of Oman with any remarks by Majlis Al-Shura and Majlis Al-Dawla.
In addition to the legislative function of Majlis Oman, the majlis is also responsible for reviewing new development plans that the government prepares as well as the General Budget of the State. An interesting aspect of the review of development plans and the General Budget of the State is that the session conducted to review them is usually confidential and not open to the public or the press.
Conclusion
The role of Majlis Al-Dawla is extremely important in the operation of the legal system in Oman that functions in conjunction with the role that Majlis Al-Shura, the elected council of Majlis Oman. Stay tuned for our next blog post to learn more about Majlis Al-Shura.
The new Labour Law introduces a variety of new provisions that provide new rights to both employees and employers. In regard to employees, these new rights include new collective bargaining provisions which include in article 121 the creation of a committee called the “Committee for Arbitration of Collective Labour Disputes.”
Under Part Eight of the Labour Law, a collective labour dispute is first referred to a different committee that includes in its membership a representative of the Ministry of Labour, a representative of employers, and a representative of the General Federation of Workers. The objective of this committee is to attempt to mediate between the parties and facilitate the settlement of the dispute. If the parties fail to sign a settlement agreement, the dispute is then referred to “arbitration procedures” by the Committee for Arbitration of Collective Labour Disputes. Article 126 states that the Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Disputes applies along with the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law in regard to the procedures of this committee in areas not covered by the Labour Law.
At first instance, permitting arbitration to be used to resolve labour disputes might seem as a progressive move that is advantageous to employers. Arbitration can potentially allow the dispute be resolved quickly without the opportunity for appeal, can allow the proceedings to be conducted in English, and can allow the matter to be dealt with privately. Arbitration may also allow the parties to select their own arbitrators.
However, a closer inspection of the provisions of Part Eight of the law makes it clear that the Committee for Arbitration of Collective Labour Disputes has nothing to do with arbitration. This committee is essentially a government tribunal chaired by a court of appeal judge and has in its membership individuals appointed by the Ministry of Labour, OCCI, and the General Federation of Workers. The only involvement of the employer in the selection of the so-called “arbitrators” is that the employer must select a replacement member if the member appointed by OCCI is absent.
These committees also fail to reflect other basic aspects of an arbitration process. In regard to the choice of language, since the chairman of this arbitration committee is a court of appeal judge, it is safe to assume that the proceedings can only be conducted in Arabic. In regard to the finality of the award, article 124 stipulates that the decision of the committee is final, but that it is also possible to contest this decision before the Supreme Court. This is in contrast with article 52 of the actual Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Disputes which states that it is not possible to contest the awards of arbitration under any legal mechanisms of contestation.
Given that you cannot select the arbitrators, the applicable law, the language, or the procedures, and that it is possible to contest the decision before the Supreme Court, it is not clear how article 126 of the Labour Law expects the provisions of the Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Disputes to apply to the resolution of disputes by these committees as the process here does not reflect arbitration in any shape or form.
The fact the proceedings of these committees are not arbitration proceedings is not unexpected, and it is possible that this confusion with arbitration is merely a result of a bad choice in the designation of the name of the committee. In the past, the Supreme Court has refused to enforce arbitration clauses used in employment contracts, as the court considers the right of employees to have access to a local dispute mechanism within the ministry and access to Omani courts as a fundamental right of the employee that cannot be waived by contract. This philosophy is supported by the fact the old Labour Law explicitly exempted workers from the payment of all court fees, while the new Labour Law stipulates the this matter will be governed by a special decision by the Ministry of Labour.
Using a special government tribunal to resolve collective labour disputes is a reasonable policy decision for the government to adopt. However, it would have been less confusing for everyone involved if the process conducted by these tribunals is not referred to as arbitration.
]]>In Oman, censorship is governed by the Law on the Censorship of Artistic Works promulgated by Royal Decree 65/97 , which—as the name suggests—provides the legal framework for the censorship of all forms of audio, visual, and audiovisual artistic works, including movies. Under this law, it is not permitted to display or perform regulated works without a licence from the Ministry of Information, which has the right under article 2 of the law to censor any work with the aim of protecting public order, public morals, and higher state interests.
In accordance with article 6 of the law, the activity of censorship of artistic works is to be undertaken by a specific department in the Ministry of Information, and article 7 allows the ministry to establish a committee of external specialists to assist the ministry in its censorship decisions. It is not clear if such a committee has been established or not. The ministry has the right to censor the whole artistic work or just a part of it.
The law offers a grievance mechanism that can be used to appeal the censorship decisions made by the ministry under article 20 of the law. Under this mechanism, it is permitted for a person concerned with the censorship decision to submit a grievance to a grievance committee established by a decision by the minister. Such grievances must be submitted within 15 days of the receipt of the censorship decision, and the committee must respond to such grievances within 30 days from the date of receiving the grievance.
Violating the provisions of the censorship can be deemed a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for up to 2 years and a fine up to 2,000 Rial Omani. The ministry also has the right to order the suspension of the display of the artistic work, the closure of the venue in which the violation took place, and the seizure of the offending works.
It is worth noting that article 30 of the law stipulates that the provisions of this law do not apply to works imported for personal use.
The status of the Barbie movie in Oman is still unclear, but if this movie is to be banned, this would not be the first time a high-profile mainstream movie is banned in the country. For example, the movie “Spider-Man: Across the Spider-Verse” was not screened in cinemas in Oman, presumably due to the fact that it contained some transgender themes. It is possible that the Barbie movie will receive the same fate as the Spider-Man movie due to transgender and other themes that are deemed by the Ministry of Information as being incompatible with Omani societal norms and culture.
You can learn more about censorship law in Oman by reading the Law on the Censorship of Artistic Works in English in full on the link below:
Fast forward to mid-2023, the Water and Wastewater Sector Law is finally out and you can read it by clicking on the below link:
Seeking to regulate a wide range of water-related activities, the new law covers not only the desalination and transportation of water, it also covers wastewater-related activities and—to a certain extent—water wells, especially as groundwater in the Sultanate becomes increasingly scarce.
Replicating a Successful Model—the Electricity Sector
The new Water and Wastewater Sector Law shares a lot in common with its older sibling, the Law on the Regulation and Privatisation of the Electricity and Related Water Sector—more commonly known in the industry as the “Sector Law”. With the passage of the Water and Wastewater Sector Law, I suspect the former will be referred to as the “Electricity Sector Law” moving forward, with the latter being referred to as the “Water Sector Law”. For the sake of simplicity, I too will follow this approach.
A considerable number of provisions in the Water Sector Law are quite similar to those found in the Electricity Sector Law. This is by design, as the new law is clearly intended to provide regulatory consistency with the long-established and well-received Electricity Sector Law. These similarities can be seen across the new law, such as in licence-related provisions, usufruct provisions, economic purchase provisions, and even in licence-modification provisions.
This should give comfort to investors interested in building desalination or sewage treatment capacity in Oman, as they would be able to invest in a sector that closely follows the success of the electricity sector, thanks to the latter’s robust and investor-oriented legislation.
This should give comfort to investors interested in building desalination or sewage treatment capacity in Oman.
In a similar fashion to the Electricity Sector Law, the Water Sector Law assigns the role of strategic decision-making to a dedicated ministry, being the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Water Resources in this case, while reserving the regulatory role for the Authority for Public Services Regulation (APSR).
To future-proof the provisions of this law, the Water Sector Law also contains a dedicated chapter on market liberalisation, with the ultimate approval in this regard lying with the Council of Ministers. This, too, is similar to the provisions set out in the Electricity Sector Law to enable further liberalisation once the market is ready for it.
Who Buys the Water?
To ensure the continuity of sufficient water supply, the Water Sector Law permits the ongoing practice adopted under the Electricity Sector Law of the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWP) purchasing water capacity and output from the independent water projects (IWPs).
This is key to the sector, as OPWP supplies the majority of water capacity for the sector, rather than the Oman Water and Wastewater Services Company (recently rebranded as the Nama Water Services Company (NWS)). Nevertheless, the Water Sector Law is flexible as it allows both OPWP and the “working companies” to contract for water, meaning that IWPs may be either contracting with OPWP or one of the working companies, being the Dhofar Integrated Services Company for projects based in Dhofar and NWS for everywhere else.
This ongoing practice of the APSR (and previously the Public Authority for Water (PAW)) assigning this role to OPWP is intentional. It seeks to capitalise on OPWP’s strengths and reputation for transparency and robustness in its procurement of capacity and output, whether this is in the form of electrons or water molecules.
Prior to the new law, unless the project involved generating electricity alongside the production of desalinated water (known in the jargon as “related water”), APSR/PAW could only assign this role to OPWP by designating the IWP as a facility of “special nature” in accordance with Decision 254/2014. This is no longer the case, as APSR has the authority to direct OPWP without the need to abide by the aforementioned decision.
The Monetary Plumbing
The water and wastewater sector continues to rely on government subsidy for its operations and the new law ensures that this is done in a timely manner by placing an obligation on the Ministry of Finance (MOF) that is almost identical to the obligation imposed upon the MOF in the Electricity Sector Law.
Notably absent in the Water Sector Law is the MOF’s obligation to secure the availability of the financing necessary for the operations of government-owned companies, whereas it is clearly set out in the Electricity Sector Law. Instead, this obligation is imposed upon the Electricity Holding Company (more commonly known as Nama Holding) in coordination with the Oman Investment Authority.
The Water Sector Law also introduces a dedicated set of provisions on tariffs, listing in it the key principles that need to be adhered to when determining tariffs, which is not as spelt out in the Electricity Sector Law.
As for the fees that the APSR collects, the approach followed under the Water Sector Law is very much in line with the one adopted under the Electricity Sector Law, with the key difference being that the APSR will now need to obtain the explicit approval of the MOF prior to imposing such fees on the licensees.
Dispute Resolution, Penalties, and Fines
In the same vein as the Electricity Sector Law, no judicial claims can be brought against a licensee without having to first go through the APSR. This ensures that the regulator of the sector can mediate and resolve these disputes during their earlier stages.
In contrast to the Electricity Sector Law, the Water Sector Law ensures that the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs (MJLA) retains its relatively-new competence to adjudicate disputes between government entities and other government entities or government-owned companies. The availability of this avenue means that a government entity can—in theory—bring its claim before the APSR, the MJLA, or the competent court, subject to satisfying their respective conditions as set out in the law.
Interestingly, the Water Sector Law makes no reference to arbitration, in stark contrast to the Electricity Sector Law, which went as far as to identify the rules of arbitration that must be followed, being the International Chamber of Commerce rules. Investors keen to retain the arbitration route would have to do so contractually, which may be a concern as the courts of Oman have previously rendered arbitration clauses invalid—albeit in very different circumstances.
The Water Sector Law also introduces some hefty fines where its provisions are violated, reaching as high as 1 million Rial Omani and potentially 2 million Rial Omani in the case of repetition, whereas the fines under the Electricity Sector Law are capped at a meagre 50,000 Rial Omani.
Finally, if a crime takes place under the Water Sector Law, the board and executive management of the companies addressed by this law run the risk of being personally held accountable if they contribute to the occurrence of the crime. This potential liability, while present in the Commercial Companies Law to some extent, is not spelt out in the Electricity Sector Law. One more reason for investors to ensure that they get quality legal services, and by extension, quality legal translations and content.
